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Abstract 
 
This working document offers a conceptual framework for understanding the processes 
underpinning the external dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs (ED-JHA). Practically, it 
defines how the export of JHA principles and norms inform the geopolitical ambitions of the 
EU, i.e. the use of space for political purposes, or the control and management of people, 
objects and movement. The author begins by investigating how the ENP reconfigures the 
ED-JHA, and then goes on to discuss various conceptual stances on governance, 
specifically institutionalism, constructivism, and policy instruments. To conclude he traces the 
evolution of this external dimension, emphasising, whenever possible, its continuities and 
bifurcations. Overall, the aim is to ascertain the extent to which conceptual designs clarify or 
advance our knowledge of the contents and rationales of the ED-JHA.  
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1. 
                                                     
Overview 
The aim of this paper is simple: to define how the export of JHA principles and norms inform 
the geopolitical ambitions of the EU. By geopolitical, I refer broadly to the use of space for 
political purposes, that is, the control and management of people, objects and movement. As 
such, the paper is about ‘governmentality’, a concept I explain below. This paper is, in many 
ways, programmatic as the ENP is still in its infancy. Rather than reinventing the wheel by 
recounting the content of Action Plans on the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, I offer 
conceptual resources for understanding the content and rationales of the external dimension 
of EU Justice and Home Affairs (ED-JHA).1 This is not an easy fix, however, because the 
task is complicated by the fact that there is an extraordinary variety of approaches that are 
assumed, or claim to bear on the ED-JHA (compare Kelley, 2006; Wolff, 2008; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Lavenex, 2004; Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005; 
Friis and Murphy, 1999). Theoretically, moreover, confusion arises because ED-JHA is not 
always carefully distinguished from EU foreign policy (see Smith and Webber, 2008, for an 
exception). In fact, although the ED-JHA is often treated as an instrument of EU external 
policy, it is best thought of as a distinctive policy, with its own raison d’être and mechanisms 
(cf. Emerson, 2004; Christiansen et al., 2000; Balzacq, 2007; Kaunert, 2005; Smith, 2006; 
Guild and Van Selm, 2005; Peers, 2008; Cremona, 2004; Monar, 2000; Mounier et al., 
2007). Finally, the literature in this field is growing so fast that the first challenge that 
confronts students is to sort out, within limits, the central features of the ED-JHA. In light of 
this, a framework that defines the substance and the logic of the ED-JHA is very much 
needed. This is what I attempt to provide here. 
Perhaps problematically, how to characterise the external action in the field of JHA separates 
students of EU politics (Léonard, 2006; Berthelet, 2007; Trauner, 2006; Wichmann, 2007). 
Despites their differences, however, what they strive to understand is essentially similar: how 
instruments primarily crafted for domestic purposes play out in non-member states. In other 
words, no matter the precise content of the policies, the challenge is to keep geographical 
borders relevant, while restructuring its effects on the normative divide between inside and 
outside (Pastore, 2001). However, the main trait of the external dimension is that it is 
constitutive of an increasing swathe of EU policies, which is reflected by the lack of 
agreement about the appropriate concept to use in order to capture the practices at work. 
This bears directly on some of the key puzzles in the vocabulary of the ED-JHA. Sarah 
Léonard (2006) underlines, for instance, that there are many labels attached to the external 
facet of EU policy in JHA, e.g.: externalisation, internationalisation, or external governance. 
In various instances, these concepts are used interchangeably with little, if any, theoretical 
justification. My claim is that, though some of these concepts overlap considerably, each 
covers a set of peculiar practices and, for that matter, deserves at least brief scrutiny. Those 
who shy away from this task usually blur the rationale of ED-JHA, giving the impression that 
anything goes.  
To start with, externalisation means, in this context, that JHA provisions become part of the 
EU list of external affairs (Rijpma and Cremona, 2007). This is most apparent in the Council 
of the European Union (2000a) document that sets out the “objectives for external relations 
in the field of Justice and Home Affairs.” In that text, externalisation means that JHA remains 
an independent policy domain, but the EU can, if it deems necessary, include specific 
policies in its external relations in order to safeguard internal security. Internationalisation, on 
the other hand, occurs when the EU acts as a distinctive polity and negotiates with third 
countries in matters that are traditionally regarded as falling within the precincts of internal 
1 ED-JHA and ED-FSJ (freedom, security and justice) are used interchangeably.  
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politics. To use the parlance of Kenneth Waltz (1979), with great trepidation, the difference 
between externalisation and internationalisation depends on where the level of analysis is 
set. In short, externalisation accounts for second-level processes, while internationalisation 
speaks to third-level or systemic interactions.  
The last master concept used in the field is external governance. To my mind, external 
governance is but one specific outcome of internationalisation. Indeed, for the purpose of this 
paper, I define external governance as a cluster of processes by which an entity A regulates, 
manages or control the behaviour and, in certain circumstances, identities and interests of an 
entity B, in context C. This is why I think the term governmentality provides explanatory 
leeway in explaining what the ED-JHA does. To use Mitchell Dean’s words (1999, p. 23), 
governmentality covers four dimensions: “1. characteristic forms of visibility, ways of seeing 
and perceiving; 2. distinctive ways of thinking and questioning, relying on definite 
vocabularies and procedures for the production of truth…; 3. specific ways of acting, 
intervening and directing, made up of particular forms of practical rationality (‘expertise’ and 
‘know-how’), and relying upon definite mechanisms, techniques, and technologies; and 4. 
characteristic ways of forming subjects, selves, persons, actors or agents.” It follows that 
extra-territorialisation, another concept often used in the domain of JHA, is an avatar of 
external governance (Rodier, 2006). Extra-territorialisation is best illustrated in the works of 
those who examine the practices of ‘remote control’, that is, EU control of border 
management as it is carried out far beyond hard material limits (Bigo and Guild, 2005; 
Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001). However, extra-territoriality need not be linked, exclusively, to 
policies that aim to curb threats (Wichmann, 2007). In fact, extra-territorialisation, as the 
other concepts discussed here, could be equally applied to the overall domain of JHA, to the 
extent that the level at which the EU is working – internal or external – is taken into account.  
The decisive point of the above discussion is that the ED-JHA aims to step up international 
security by strengthening the resources and abilities of third countries, to act in the field of 
security, including border management. Thus, it is the central tenet of the external dimension 
that security is relational, and that the EU will be better off via intensive cooperation, that is, 
“mutual adjustment in policy that improves (its) welfare” (Lake, 1999, p. 25; Keohane, 1984). 
This view of cooperation differs from a neoliberal account that predicts that cooperation 
delivers, by any means, absolute gains to the partners involved in the process (see Baldwin, 
1993). I argue that this need not be the case. On the contrary, it might even produce less 
security for one of the partners while increasing, somewhat paradoxically, the density of 
interactions among actors comprising the relationship. Therefore the results of cooperation 
rarely coincide with the planned objectives and might, on different occasions, yield 
considerable indirect effects.   
It is held, for instance, that JHA provisions contained in ENP Action Plans aim to establish an 
inclusive security framework. In the literature, however, there is a wide recognition that the 
ENP framework is set on, and inevitably reproduces, a relation that is considerably 
asymmetric (Tassinari, 2005; Balzacq, 2007). Following David Lake (1999, p. 24-31), 
asymmetric security relationships are defined as interactions in which one of the partners (of 
a dyad) possesses a quantum of ‘residual control’ over the other. The production of security 
in an asymmetric cooperation pattern often takes two forms, empire and informal empire 
models. In an empire, Lake (1999, p. 28) assumes, “two polities are melded together in a 
hierarchic relationship in which one party controls the other.” An informal empire displays a 
form of hierarchy, too, but departs from an empire on one essential account: the control 
exerted by the dominant partner does not prevent it from building ties with third countries 
even though the content of those interactions might be influenced by the external authority. 
In other words, an informal empire produces compliance through specific mechanisms of 
control, management or regulation in a chosen functional area (Lake, 1999, p. 31; Zielonka, 
2007).  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. I begin by investigating how the ENP 
reconfigures the ED-JHA, through a peculiar approach to borders/identities and 
borders/orders articulations. This helps me to identify and separate out the major elements of 
the ED-JHA, which call up a distinctive mode of management, termed governance. We will 
then be in a position to discuss conceptual stances on the governance of the ED-JHA. 
Specifically, I argue that among the many ways of analysing governance, three intellectual 
traditions – institutionalism, constructivism, and policy instruments – are best suited for 
understanding the processes at work in the ED-JHA. Finally, I trace the evolution of the ED-
JHA, emphasising, whenever possible, continuities and bifurcations. Overall, the aim is to 
ascertain the extent to which conceptual designs clarify or advances our knowledge of the 
contents and rationales of the ED-JHA.  
2. 
                                                     
Borders, Security Externalities, Governance 
In May 2004, the Commission presented its project on the ENP. Cut to the bone, the ENP 
has three main objectives: enhancing co-operation in the political field as well as in security 
matters and social-economic development in a way that is distinct from EU membership 
(Commission of the European Union, 2004). There are 16 countries involved – Algeria, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, 
Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine – which suggests that 
rather than being a policy stripped of any ambition, as claimed by some sceptics, the ENP 
aims to design new relationships with countries of different political cultures, on a wide range 
of topics. It is not, by any means, an easy task to define such a policy particularly when one 
needs to reconcile the aims of external relations with those of JHA. On the one hand, 
openness – including a degree of liberalisation of movement of persons from the 
neighbouring countries in view of reinforcing good neighbourly relations – is called for, while 
on the other hand, the need to strictly implement the Schengen acquis on border controls 
and visa regimes is emphasised. One major, and persistent, challenge for eastern and 
southern neighbours is how to convince the EU that they can be good partners in complying 
with the objectives of Schengen by cooperating with the EU in controls on who crosses the 
EU external borders (Andreas, 2003, pp. 102-07).  
If we are interested in the ED-JHA as it relates to ENP, then we have to take stock of border 
processes. Borders naturally have material (i.e., they separate inside from outside) and 
cognitive (i.e., they distinguish us and them) functions (cf. Agnew, 1998; Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1995; O’Tuathail, 1996; Walker, 1993; Dalby, 1991; Anderson, 1996; Berg and 
Ehin 2006). Most ENP scholarship, proponents and critics alike, concur that border 
management is a fundamental policy at which EU concerns with identity and order intersect 
(compare Smith, 2006; Tassinari, 2005; Raik, 2006). Under this heading, I briefly discuss 
what is called, in Yosef Lapid’s (1996, pp. 10-5) words, “borders-to-identities” and “borders-
to-orders” sequences. I do not take up opposite sequences (i.e., identities-to-borders and 
orders-to-borders) as I believe they do not quite exemplify what is at stake in ED-JHA. To my 
mind, the design of EU borders seems to predate the emergence of a specific EU identity, as 
order presupposes a reliable ‘dispositif’ of border management (e.g., surveillance 
technologies, police training, operational cooperation, joint patrols, data sharing).2  
2.1 Borders and identities 
Although debates on identity are rarely explicit in EU policies, a closer scrutiny of discursive 
practices seem to reveal that identity, in the sense of a constitutive ‘we’, matters more than 
often thought (Rieker, 2004). For instance, asked by the European Parliament’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee whether Ukraine could qualify for EU membership, Gunther Verheugen 
2 The concept is Foucault’s (1980). See also Pløger (2008).
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(1999) retorted “I think that anybody who thinks that Ukraine should be taken in the 
EU…should perhaps come along with the argument that Mexico should be taken into the US” 
(cited in Primatarova, 2005, p.33). This is probably overstated and history might, sooner or 
later, contradict the former Enlargement Commissioner. Nonetheless, the analogy with the 
US-Mexico relationship has the virtue of tabling questions of identities in the EU-neighbours’ 
relationships, despite a strong geographic contiguity. Yet the ultimate aim of the ENP, as 
Romano Prodi (2002) points out, is to “extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, 
values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union” (emphasis 
added). In other words, the constitutive identity of the EU is decisively normative. Yet, the 
fact that neighbours think and behave according to the EU templates, does not license them 
to membership.  
This position might sound inconsistent, but for the EU it is not. It is argued, indeed, that the 
ENP pursues distinctive objectives, but uses the same tools as those of enlargement, 
including learning and socialisation, conditionality, and benchmarking (Kelley, 2006). Even 
though neighbours could develop a form of complex learning of EU norms and standards, 
which affects their identities and interests, they remain different. Thus, the challenge for the 
ENP is to accommodate “the extension of the legal boundaries of authority” to the relatively 
static material limits of the EU (Lavenex, 2004, p. 686). This is a tall order, and sceptics 
would argue that EU borders are not at all static; they would claim, instead, that EU borders 
are flexible, and in constant flux. Point taken; but my purpose is not to question the fact that 
EU borders might move, or that the regime of EU borders might vary, from one point of entry 
to another. Far from it. For a neighbourhood policy to exist there needs to be two separate 
polities. This necessarily raises, in turn, problems of identities and differences that students 
of EU politics should grapple with seriously, not dismiss out of hand.  
2.2 Borders and orders 
To paraphrase Michel Foucault (1967), the greatest anxiety of the EU is with space. In this 
context, the EU policy is to establish common standards with regard to border management 
at the Union's external borders to enable thus an area of freedom, security and justice 
without control at internal borders for persons, whatever their nationality, within the EU 
(Higashino, 2004; Kirchner and Sperling, 2000). This needs to be seen in a wider context 
and it covers aspects of international cooperation as this is indispensable to ensure the 
smooth running of the system, particularly concerning activities in and arrangements with 
countries of origin and transit, whereby the focus is first on the issuing of visa and other 
consular issues as well as readmission/return matters (dialogue on migration and asylum). 
There is, moreover, the technical border cooperation with neighbouring countries (e.g. new 
neighbours in the East) as well as traditional trading and political partnerships (e.g. the US 
and Canada), the intention of which is to enhance security but also to create a smoother 
system of managing borders and anticipating problems (Smith, 1996). 
However, EU territoriality – “the attempt to…affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, 
and relationships by delineating and asserting control over a geographic area” – is as 
mutable as its boundaries (Sack, 1986, p.19). In fact, rather than simply broadening the limits 
of EU, as it is often assumed, each round of enlargement reactivates, or redistributes, border 
management priorities. Thus, the 2004 enlargement brought into sharp focus EU relations 
with its neighbours. As Christopher Patten and Javier Solana (2002) put it, “decisions on 
enlargement…will bring the duel challenge of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe while 
responding to needs arising from the newly created borders of the Union.” It is therefore 
urgent, so the argument goes, that “we…fully exploit the new opportunities created by 
enlargement to develop relations with our neighbours.” In this approach, “stability, prosperity, 
shared values and rule of law along (EU) borders are all fundamental for (its) security. 
Failure in any of these areas will lead to increased risks of negative spillover on the Union.” 
In other words, the ENP strives, primarily, to curb “negative externalities” stemming from the 
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2004 enlargement (Grant, 2006).3 The figure below might be useful in understanding the 
challenge confronting the Union. 
 
Figure 1. Europe’s neighbourhood and its regions 
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Source: Tassinari, 2005. 
Our interest in borders-to-orders and borders-to-identities sequences should not preclude 
equally decisive intersections, namely order-to-identity, and vice-versa. In security studies, 
these intersections have been examined by students of societal security (Buzan et al., 1990; 
McSweeney, 1999). Identities/orders intersections are important for the ENP partly because 
a sustainable political order requires some kind of collective identity, and partly because 
change in the latter often alters political order. The converse is true (Deudney and Ikenberry, 
1999; Hall, 1999; Neumann, 1999). But there are degrees in collective identity formation. It 
takes two important forms, a pluralistic security community, on the one hand, and integration, 
on the other. Barry Buzan (1983, p.190) captures this in one generic term, security 
complexes, i.e., “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently 
closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one 
another.” At base, pluralist security communities and integration enjoy quite the same level of 
security as their collective identity commits members to the non-use of military force, 
inviolability of borders, as well as an increase in transboundary interactions (Morgan, 1997, 
p.37).  
However, integration goes a step further. It happens when a group of states pool their efforts 
together, across different sectors, and create a new internal political sphere. In this light, the 
level of practice shifts too; in fact, while pluralist security communities operate at the 
systemic level, integration works at the domestic level (Morgan, 1997, p.38). Inevitably, 
therefore, this leads us to the view that the ENP aims to set up a regional pluralist security 
                                                     
3 David Lake (1997, p. 49) defines externalities as “costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive 
externalities) that do not accrue only to the actors that create them. They are also known as spillover or 
neighbourhood affects.” 
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community. That system is called regional because it refers to a “set of states affected by at 
least one transborder but local externality that emanates from a particular geographic area” 
(Lake, 1997, p. 49). Thus, the ED-JHA is regarded as an attempt by the EU to “expand its 
sphere of governance in particular in areas which have become securitized inside and where 
vulnerability is attributed to developments in the third countries in question” (Lavenex, 2004, 
p. 686). It is this concept of governance and the intellectual resources it triggers, that inform 
the next section. 
3. Theoretical Approaches to Governance and their Limits 
The concept of governance is elastic (cf. Rhodes, 2007; Evans, 1995; Peters, 1996; Pierre 
and Peters, 2000; Pierre, 2000). In fact, either as a theory or a framework, governance is 
used in different settings, for various purposes and as such generally triggers distinctive 
understandings of issues on which it is brought to bear (Self, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Typically, 
contributions to the literature on governance can be articulated around two classes of 
studies. While the first examines ways of marking out governance from government, the 
second class turns the arrows of explanation in another direction, to focus on different 
theoretical approaches to governance. However, most studies now do both, by linking critical 
analysis on the transformation of modes of government to conceptual discussions about 
governance as an alternative to, or an instantiation of changes in government functioning 
(see Webber, 2007).  
Thus, my task in this section is straightforward: I define the concept of governance and 
delineate its features as they relate to the issue of security. To do this, I document important 
approaches to governance and compare, or better contrast them to the cognate, but radical 
concept, of governmentality. Three theories of governance often regarded as essential in 
grasping the external processes of EU internal security are institutionalism, constructivism 
and policy instrument analysis. Each explores governance through a distinctive lens, 
highlighting some facets, while ignoring others. The aim is to arrive at a coherent, complex 
but tractable concept of governance, one which could help students come to terms with the 
rationales and functions of the external dimension of EU-JHA.  
3.1 What is governance? 
This question preoccupies those who examine the substantive aspect of governance; the 
thrust being to glean the defining features of governance. For instance, Andrew Gamble 
(2000, p.110) defines governance as: “the steering capacities of a political system without 
making any assumption as to which institution or agents make the steering”. In the same 
vein, Elke Krahmann (2003, p.11), in an attempt to capture the emerging architecture of 
transatlantic security, postulates that: “governance denotes the structure and processes 
which enable a set of public and private actors to coordinate their independent needs and 
interests through the making and implementation of binding policy decisions in the absence 
of a central political authority.” Further, Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham (1994, p.78), in a way 
that echoes Michel Foucault, describe governance as really a combination of three things: “1) 
‘government’, as in the rule of a nation-state, a region, or municipal area; 2) ‘self-
government’, as in control of own emotions and behaviour; and 3) ‘governor’, as in devices 
fitted to machines to regulate their energy intake and hence control or manage their 
performance.”4 Finally, Emil J. Kirchner (2006) reaches a similar conclusion, but draws on 
different sources. In this context, government is pitted against governance. While the former 
concentrates on the Weberian view of a centralised authority able to impose its will on the 
society to achieve planned objectives, the latter emphasises, by contrast: “how the regulation 
of societies or the international system has come to involve political actors aside from 
                                                     
4 Emphases added.  
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governments.” In any case, governance is not a closed theoretical system, but rather 
designates a wide set of methods to regulate, control or manage ‘known’ entities (Hunt and 
Wickham, 1994, p.79).  
3.2 Theories of governance 
Conceptual approaches to governance differ in the status they accord to specific actors, 
factors or processes. This is not to claim, however, that theories of governance are 
incompatible, though some will be relevant to understanding certain types of phenomena, 
and not others. In fact, constructivism has been mostly used by students of EU integration, 
whereas institutionalism has been taken up by those who examine how different EU bodies 
operate. By contrast, policy tools remain largely unexplored – theoretically, though not in 
substance. In this section, however, I argue that governance is conceptually agnostic and 
that each approach has something to tell us about the ED-JHA. 
3.2.1 Institutionalism 
Generally, approaches that fall under this heading combine, though in various guises, 
rationalist and constructivist premises. In particular, they raise two kinds of difficult questions, 
what counts as an institution and, more importantly, what impact, if any, do institutions have 
on the structure and outcome of political action? Those who study institutions argue that 
“through the development of specific competencies, organisations can potentially transform 
agendas and goals” and that “these entities can function as creators of meaning and 
identities” (Simmons and Martin, 2002, p.193). In short, institutions are “political actors in 
their own right” (March and Olsen, 1984, p.738). 
The problem with this perspective, however, is that students of institutionalism rarely agree 
about the adequate definition of institutions. In fact, any new definition of institutions, it is 
held, will very likely suffer from the same defects as those that are said to cripple previous 
attempts. To a certain extent, notwithstanding, it is now admitted, but for a few exceptions 
(Keohane, 1983), that institutions are: “sets of rules meant to govern international behaviour” 
(Simmons and Martin, 2002, p.194; see also Mearsheimer, 1994/95). Beth Simmons and 
Lisa Martin observe that this definition presents three advantages, at least. To start with, in 
contrast to definitions of regime that dominated IR’s understanding of institutions in the 
1980s, this definition is parsimonious, and only includes the constitutive features of 
institutions. Moreover, it does not conflate institutions and organisations, as some informal 
institutions are not embodied by a visible organisation. Finally, this definition clearly 
delineates what an institution is from what it does. In sum, Simmons and Martin (2002, p. 
194) conclude, that this specification “allows for the systematic evaluation of a broad range of 
theoretical claims using a single definition of institutions.” 
According to Peters (1999, p. 149), institutionalism is a “broad, if variegated, approach”. In 
this light, it would be preposterous to attempt to discuss all the families of institutionalisms on 
offer. I focus therefore on what has come to be regarded as a classical typology. Peter Hall 
and Rosemary Taylor (1996) propose three broad views of institutional analysis: rational 
choice, sociological and historical institutionalisms. The first, rational choice institutionalism, 
insists on material incentives as constraints for action. In this light, it is held that actors are 
but susceptible to simple learning, that which transforms their behaviours, not their identities 
or interests (see Shepsle and Weingast, 1995). Contrary to constructivism, which assumes 
that organisation “can become autonomous sites of authority”, rational choice institutionalism 
claims that organisations are instruments purposefully used by actors for their own best 
interests and, “unless a net gain resulted from membership”, so the argument goes, 
“members would not join (or remain in the club)” (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p. 707). In 
this approach, governance primarily consists of manipulating incentives in order to increase 
the net values or pursuing cooperation in a given form, within a specific context.  
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Sociological institutionalism focuses on the production of meaning by institutions. In the 
literature today, this view is associated with cognitive approaches to institutions, whereby 
“what a creature does is, in large part, a function of the creator’s representation of its 
environment” (d’Andrade, 1984, p. 88). To reduce uncertainty actors set up a common 
framework that helps them to assign meaning to situations and to new actors they encounter. 
Finally, historical institutionalism builds a synthetic argument on the relation between action 
and institutions, by putting together rational choice and sociological insights. In brief, it is 
premised upon the idea that current decisions and actions are affected by the initial 
conditions under which institutions were crafted. 
There is nothing in this section to suggest that any of the institutionalist strands ‘takes it all’. 
In fact, it seems obvious today that students of institutionalism are question-driven rather 
than school-driven. What determines whether one strand is emphasised over another is at 
base empirical relevance. In a compelling paper, Fearon and Wendt (2002) show that 
assumptions upon which various kinds of institutionalism dwell – i.e. rationalism and 
constructivism – are not as incompatible as often held. Perhaps, in this light, the most 
promising route for students of the ED-JHA is to determine the extent to which a priori 
emphasis on any of the approaches to institutionalism affects the questions they ask and 
inevitably the results they reach.  
3.2.2 Constructivism 
While rational choice institutionalism begins with exogenous identities and interests that 
govern the use of institutions, constructivism starts, by contrast, from endogenous identities 
and interests that emerge, evolve and change through interactions among actors, on the one 
hand, and between actors and institutions, on the other (cf. Onuf, 1989; Kratochwil, 1989; 
Finnemore, 1993, 1996; Legro, 1997). When applied to the study of norms, institutions 
appear as “chief socializing agents” that constrain “targeted actors to adopt new policies and 
laws, and to ratify treaties…” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p.902). Taking a different tack, 
Alexander Wendt explores the ontological form of institutions. This leads him to argue that 
institutions are “a structure of identity and interest” (Wendt 1992, p.399). This definition is 
simple, but potentially strong. Taking this position on institutions implies, first, that they are 
essentially stable entities, material or not. In this view, moreover, institutions that embody 
characteristic identities and interests are contextual in the sense that they reflect specific 
ways of being, and distinctive preferences about what deserves to be pursued. The ultimate 
question, therefore, is whose interests and identities do institutions exemplify or promote?  
The answer, of course, is not as simple as one might think, as it goes deep into the 
intentionality of institutions, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Whatever the posture 
one adopts, notwithstanding, the purposes of institutions in terms of governance is to create 
the conditions for a viable collective security, by transforming the meaning of interactions, 
from individualism to a security community of sorts. These insights find considerable support 
in the ENP, the aim of which is to set out a cooperative system of security, through new 
intersubjective meanings. Before it does anything else security governance aims to create 
the processes conducive to a system of cooperative security. This carries us into Wendt’s 
continuum of security. Crucially, the most general proposition is that collective identity 
formation depends, at least in principle, as much on structural contexts as it does on 
systemic and strategic practices.  
Structural contexts. Interaction dynamics are the basis of the construction of intersubjective 
structures in international relations. For constructivists, systemic structures are built from 
common social knowledge and shared understandings. Moreover, the nature of anarchy is 
determined by the nature of the intersubjective structure that actors build. In turn, collective 
identity created by these intersubjective understandings can either be exclusive in the sense 
that actors forsake previous social structures and carve out new ones, or inclusive, when a 
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powerful state coerces weaker states to adopt its identity (see Prodi, 2002). In this case, 
actors find themselves in a collective hegemonic identity à la Gramsci (Wendt, 1994, p.389).  
Systemic processes. Wendt (ibid.) defines systemic processes as “dynamic in the external 
context of state action.” Two systemic processes are discussed: interdependence and the 
transnational convergence of domestic values. The first can take two forms, the “dilemma of 
common interest” created by an increase in the “dynamic density” and the “dilemma of 
common aversion” produced by the emergence of a threatening ‘common other’. Whatever 
the form taken by interdependence, it pursues the same aim, i.e. to render actors less 
inclined to unilateral activities and increase the “incentive to identify with others” (Ibid.). The 
second systemic process highlighted by Wendt is called societal or transnational 
convergence. It has at least two different sources, interdependence and demonstration 
effects (e.g., diffusion and lesson-drawing). The core effect of the transnational convergence 
of domestic values (cultural, economical, political, etc.) is to reduce the heterogeneity among 
actors who, as a consequence, gradually develop the consciousness that others are neither 
so different, nor as threatening as they might be. In this light, a constructivist reading would 
argue that one of the decisive objectives of the ENP is to arrive at a desecuritised 
relationship between neighbours and the EU (see Tassinari, 2005). 
Strategic practice. This refers to a form of interaction in which: “others are assumed to be 
purposive agents with whom one is interdependent.” (Wendt, 1994, p. 390). Here, Wendt 
tries to depart from rationalist propositions on cooperation. The analytical bite of rationalism, 
it can be argued, is that strategic interactions are able to change patterns of behaviour, but 
identities and interests remain fixed during interactions. Thus, Wendt draws a distinction 
between behavioural and rhetorical interaction. One kind of behavioural practice is that of 
altercasting, that is, a: “technique of interactor control in which ego uses tactics of self-
presentation and stage management in an attempt to frame alter’s definitions of social 
situations in ways that create the role which ego desires alter to play.” (Wendt, 1992, p.421; 
1999, p.346). In short, cooperative interactions enable actors to present themselves in a new 
light while internalising new beliefs about others and selves. 
In the second sense, constructivism assumes, interactions are rhetorical (Balzacq, 
forthcoming). How should we understand this? Rhetorical practices are conscious symbolic 
practices discursively mediated, contrived to alter the image and the conception of the self 
within a strategic environment. They can take different forms, including multilateral dialogues, 
symbolic actions or signals. The content of rhetorical practices can vary, too. It could either 
be a securitising move (as in the case of illegal migration), or a de-securitisation move (as in 
the case of integration). However, rhetorical and behavioural practices are very close. For 
instance, altercasting can be implemented both through discursive mediations and symbolic 
works. What stands out here is that, in any account, the outcome of strategic practices 
depends on the meaning ascribed to the linguistic categorisation of pedagogic codes 
(Bernstein, 1971). Specifically, codes can be either restricted or extended. They are 
restricted if language is contextualised in a dyadic relationship that presupposes a tacit 
shared background knowledge. On the other hand, codes are extended if actors linguistically 
interact without having a significant degree of tacit background assumptions shared with 
others. The first case is more open to genuine symbolic exchange than the second. Thus, 
the construction of Action Plans, which are negotiated between the EU and its partners, aims 
to design a common knowledge of issues at hand in order to carve out convergent policies. 
The above discussion – on causal factors offered by Wendt in order to understand the 
internal process of collective identity formation amongst states – structural contexts, systemic 
processes, and strategic practice, can be summarised as follows: 
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Table 1. A summary of Wendt’s model of collective identity formation 
CAUSAL FACTORS FORMS SOURCES EFFECTS 
Behavioural 
• Self-presentation 
• Altercasting 
STRATEGIC PRACTICES 
Rhetorical • Discursive symbols 
Change the image 
of the self and the 
other within a 
strategic 
environment 
Interdependence
• Density of interaction 
• Common Other 
Reduce the egoistic 
attitude 
SYSTEMIC PROCESSES 
Societal 
convergence 
• Interdependence 
• Demonstration effort, 
diffusion, lesson 
drawing 
Reduce the 
heterogeneity 
amongst actors 
STRUCTURAL CONTEXT Intersubjective structures 
• Social knowledge, 
• Shared meanings and 
expectations 
Gives meaning to 
material structures 
 
3.2.3 Policy instruments 
A third set of general approaches to the question of governance emphasises the ‘life cycle’ of 
policy instruments – choice, function, and effects (Balzacq, 2008a). One tension within the 
literature concerns the relative focus on the ‘neutral’ efficiency of instruments. To put my 
cards on the table, my view of tools is compatible with the precepts of critical theory (Wyn 
Jones, 1999). In fact, a tool approach to governance should not be equated with an 
instrumental view of a policy, which holds that policy tools are: “subservient to values 
established in other social spheres – political and cultural” (Feenberg, 1991, p.5).  
To demonstrate the utility of a tool approach to governance, I proceed in two steps. First, I 
delineate the boundaries of a policy tool and discuss its central features. Second, I examine 
types of tools that embody these traits, by stressing how each shapes our understanding of 
governance. 
3.2.4 Of instruments: definition and key features 
What, then, is an instrument or a tool of public action? Given the range of definitions, 
connotations and degrees of abstraction, a useful first step may be to outline more precisely 
what an instrument is not. First, an instrument is not a programme. In general, a programme 
comprises one or more tools that it mobilises in specific circumstances. This means that a 
single tool can be brought to bear on particular fields or problems by different programmes. If 
this perspective is credible, one could perhaps argue that a tool is more general than a 
programme. Second, and more significantly, a tool is not a policy. Typically, policies are 
more general than tools as they are primarily: “collections of programmes operating on a 
similar field or aimed at some general objective” (Salamon, 2002, p.20).  
The confusion between these elements – i.e. programme and policy – has long obstructed 
concrete definition. This accords with the extant variety and somewhat multifaceted aspects 
of artefacts labelled tools within the governance literature. Generally, definitions reproduce a 
neutral approach to policy tools. For instance, Hoogerwerf (1989, p.4) codes instruments as: 
“everything that an actor uses or could potentially use to aid in the attainment of one or more 
CASE Network Studies& Analyses No. 377 - Thierry Balzacq, The External Dimension of EU Justice ... 
 
 18
 
goals” (Hoogerwerf, 1989, p.4). This is not always so. In fact, more nuanced approaches 
postulate that instruments can be grasped either as objects or as activities (de Bruijn and 
Hufen, 1998, pp. 13-4). In the first sense, instruments are tangible, that is, mostly material 
phenomena. By contrast, as practices, instruments are: “a collection of policy activities that 
show similar characteristics focused on influencing and governing social purposes” 
(Ringeling, 1983, p.1). 
This distinction is coherent and useful, but it is incomplete. For instance, it does not allow for 
a synthetic understanding of instruments. Thus, the precise meaning of instruments remains 
underspecified. The reason for this is not hard to find. Indeed, certain instruments that are 
traditionally regarded as objects have, on closer scrutiny, the main endogenous features of 
activities (Hood, 1983). FRONTEX, the body set up to coordinate member states’ operational 
cooperation to secure the EU’s external borders is, for example, not so much an object as a 
set of activities and processes. Given this caveat, I define a tool or an instrument of 
governance as an identifiable social and technical ‘dispositif’ or device embodying a specific 
image of ‘social reality’ through which public action is configured in order to address a issue 
(Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004, p.13; Linder and Peters, 1984; Salamon, 2002, p.19). This 
definition, imperfect as it may be, offers three basic characteristics of instruments of 
governance.  
First, each instrument has defining features that align it with others, and design traits that 
make it unique or, at least, differentiate it from others. For instance, all JHA databases 
require the collection, storage and exchange of information, but they differ significantly in the 
nature of information they hold, the duration of the storage, and the conditions under which 
their data can be retrieved. Second, tools configure actions, in the sense that each 
instrument “has its own operating procedures, skills requirements, and delivering 
mechanisms, indeed its own ‘political economy’” (Salamon, 2002, p.2). What is involved 
here, moreover, is the idea that tools are institutions of sorts. According to this view, they are 
a routine set of rules and procedures that structure the interactions among individuals and 
organisations. In short, policy tools can configure social relations in decisive ways. In this 
respect, by their very nature, tools “define who is involved in the operation of public 
programmes, what their roles are, and how they relate to each other” (Salamon, 2002, p.19). 
In other words, governance instruments reconfigure what is called public action, the aim of 
which is to address issues identified as targets of public action. Third, and finally, policy tools 
embody a specific image of the partners and, to a large extent, what ought to be done about 
them. In this respect, the ENP categorises partners and commands a particular method of 
dealing with them (through control, management, benchmarking, etc.) 
Thus, the policy instruments of governance do not represent a purely technical solution to a 
public problem. Of course, the operational – i.e. technical – character of a governance 
instrument has to be adequately linked to a specific issue that it intends to address. 
However, a narrow focus on the operational aspect of governance tools neglects two crucial 
features of instruments, namely the political and symbolic elements. On the one hand, they 
are fundamentally political. Both the selection and use, as well as the effects of governance 
instruments depend on political factors and, in turn, require political mobilisation (Peters, 
1998, p.552). It should thus be kept in mind that while governance tools might have technical 
attributes, the reason they are chosen, how they operate, evolve, and what their 
consequences are cannot simply be reduced to the technical particulars of the instruments. 
On the other hand, there are symbolic attributes built into policy instruments: “that (tell) the 
population what the (EU) is thinking…and what its collective perception of problems (is)” 
(Peters and van Nispen, 1998, p.3). In other words, the focus on the political and symbolic 
aspects of governance instruments will lend an imaginative leap into a more robust 
conceptualisation of how “the intention of policy could be translated into operational 
activities” (de Bruijn and Hufen, 1998, p. 12). Seen from this perspective, the most important 
implication is that governance policy tools relate to complex attributes of instruments. To use 
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Salamon’s words (2002, p.20), a tool is a ‘package’ that is made up of four different 
elements: 
• A type of good or activity (e.g. the provision of information, training, surveillance). 
• A delivery vehicle for this good or activity (e.g. media, electronic devices). 
• A delivery system, that is, a set of organisations that are engaged in providing the good, 
service, or activity (e.g. an agency, air carriers, a Directorate General). 
• A set of rules, whether formal or informal, defining the relationship among the entities that 
comprise the delivery system (e.g. the EU Directive on the retention of 
telecommunication data). 
It follows therefore that knowledge of governance instruments and their attributes reflects 
something of the problem to which public action is meant to respond. Further, it reveals 
policy preferences and the direction of action. In spite of basic similar attributes, each 
governance tool has different effects. To be sure, different tools are not equally effective in all 
cases. Indeed, securitisation instruments can sometimes have limited consequences or 
indirect effects. It becomes obvious therefore that the function of an instrument has a major 
impact on governance. That function depends, itself, on the nature of the tool. 
3.2.5 Types of instruments 
Attempts to classify policy instruments are quite common in public policy literature (Hood, 
1983; Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2004, pp. 357-63; Schneider and Ingram, 1990; van Nispen 
and Ringeling, 1998, pp. 204-17). There is no shortage of typologies. This is mainly due to 
the fact that students of public action use distinct dimensions in order to compare and 
contrast tools. Christopher Hood (1983), for example, focuses on two key dimensions: (1) the 
role of the government by whom they are used; and (2) the government resources they enlist 
(such as organisation, authority). From a different theoretical perspective, Lorraine 
McDonnell and Richard Elmore (1987) sort instruments in terms of the strategy of 
intervention that governments use, leading to four types of tool: mandates, capacity-building, 
system changing, and inducements. Still based essentially on the kind of government 
intervention, Frans van der Doelen (1989) divides tools into three distinct families: the legal, 
the communication, and the economic families. Finally, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram 
(1990) produce a fivefold classification emphasising behaviours that tools seek to change: 
authority, incentive, capacity, symbolic and learning tools. In the extreme, of course, this 
diversity may sound enigmatic. It should not be. To be sure, each classification tries to 
capture different facets of policy instruments. 
Regulatory Instruments. Those who choose to capture governance in terms of tools will find 
that regulatory instruments are among the most common techniques used by the EU to 
achieve its security objectives (e.g. Action Plans, Commission Communication, Council 
Declaration, Directives, Framework Decisions). The starting-point here is that regulatory tools 
seek to ‘normalise’ the behaviour of target partners. Policy instruments thus aim to influence 
the behaviours of social actors by permitting certain practices to reduce the threat; by 
prohibiting some types of political activities; by promoting learning to impart perceptions. 
Moreover, that which makes regulatory instruments so attractive is that they often provide the 
framework within which both incentive and capacity tools operate. The main problem with 
regulatory tools, however, is that they require monitoring and enforcement, which provokes 
high management costs that the EU is unable, at this stage, to handle. For instance, the 
European Evidence Warrant foreseen by the Hague Programme (2004) in order to improve 
judicial cooperation for obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in 
criminal matters has produced, mainly due to an incapacitating lack of trust, a deceptively 
trivial agreement that satisfies neither the EU Commission, nor the majority of member 
states. 
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Incentive Instruments. In contrast to regulatory tools, incentives are typically non-coercive. 
Much contemporary incentive approaches to instruments premises upon the simple 
rationalist assumption that social actors are utility maximizers: put simply, they will only 
purposively select policy-relevant actions that are in their own best interests. The view taken 
by Ingram and Schneider identifies the main categories of incentives tools. They posit: “the 
incentive category includes tools that rely on tangible payoffs, positive or negatives to induce 
compliance….” This formulation is robust, not least because it assumes that social actors 
“will not be positively motivated to take policy-relevant action unless they are influenced, 
encouraged, or coerced by manipulation of money, liberty, life, or other tangible payoffs” 
(Ingram and Schneider, 1990, pp. 513-15). The EU uses, in particular, two types of incentive 
tools. The first of these is the inducement tools, that is, a set of positive payoffs to stimulate 
participation in policy-relevant activities. On the other hand, the EU is increasingly imposing 
penalties on actors who refuse to cooperate, or rather comply. Both tools are strongly 
associated with the ENP, whereby partners that meet standards of cooperation set in the 
Action Plans are offered rewards. In fact, the EU uses incentives (e.g. trade agreements, 
development aid) that aim to reduce resistances and encourage partners to respond 
positively (e.g. tighten border control, sign readmission agreements with the EU, host 
Europol liaison officers). Surely, inducement and sanctions are, obviously, substitute means. 
However, they do not produce the same net utility for the EU. In this situation, the main 
challenge for the EU is to calibrate inducements so that sanctions are no longer applicable 
as the inducement is strong enough.  
Capacity Tools. These are the most contentious tools of the EU neighbourhood strategy; yet 
they are the most preferred. In simple terms, capacity tools often call for enablement skills, 
that is, skills that allow individuals, groups and agencies to make decisions and carry out 
activities, which have a reasonable probability of success (Ingram and Schneider 1990, 
p.517). In this sense, capacity tools include, inter alia, information, training, force, and other 
resources necessary to the attainment of policy purposes (e.g. the budget). Thus, Abdelkrim 
Belguendouz (2005) observes that there has been an increase in the budget allocated to 
border management, thereby shifting the original priorities of the MEDA programme. In other 
words, capacity tools are useful devices if one is to trace the endogenous transformations of 
a policy, some of which evade linguistic articulation. It is important to highlight, moreover, 
that I am hereby concerned with ‘external’ tools, that is, tools that are mobilised to affect 
social actors. These tools are naturally opposed to internal ones, which aim to lubricate the 
internal working of the EU.5 Finally, capacity instruments are hardly stable. EU databases, 
for example, are always under pressure to adopt new protocols and practices, to extend their 
functions, and to mobilise new resources to attend to the transformations of what is 
perceived as a precarious environment.  
To summarise, I have shown that there are various ways of understanding governance, and 
that each underlines distinctive characteristics of the latter. I did not, however, mean to argue 
that these positions were incommensurable; nor are they reducible, one to another. Instead, 
the richness of the theoretical traditions on governance testifies to the incredible diversity of 
practices at play, which constitutes, in my view, the ultimate focus of analysis.  
The next section is not, therefore, committed to a particular ‘school’ of governance. Instead, it 
draws freely on different currents of thought reviewed above. In doing so, I am more 
concerned with the empirical relevance of conceptual frameworks than with their aesthetic 
theoretical designs. This, I think, has often been very distracting to students of social 
sciences of various theoretical persuasions. Thus, the section traces, briefly, the genealogy 
of the external dimension, outlining, whenever possible, the competing rationales that shape 
it. The thrust is to underline the institutionalisation of the external dimension, discuss its 
logics, and examine its effects on the evolution of EU relations with its neighbours. 
                                                     
5 On the difference between internal and external tools, see Salamon (2002).  
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4. The Formation of ED-JHA 
Telling the story of the field can take a variety of forms, but the most common is temporal 
and linear (see Berthelet, 2007; Léonard, 2006). This strategy presents both a strength and a 
weakness. The strength is that one has to compile the most important dates and discuss the 
content of documents produced thereof. The weakness is that students of JHA very rarely 
agree on whether a given moment is important or not, leaving it to the sheer judgement of 
the analyst. Yet, even the weakness offers me a window, as I draw the lesson that listing a 
catalogue of dates is less important than tracing the stakes at work within the developments 
of the ED-JHA. Thus, in what follows I examine the genealogy of the ED-JHA, but I insist on 
the competing rationales that shape it. Specifically, I build the genealogy of the external 
dimension upon the assumption that it has evolved from a loosely connected series of 
intentions, focusing on migration issues, to a highly embroidered policy that enlists ambitious 
programmes (e.g., the ENP) and instruments (e.g., the exchange of information, 
benchmarking, European Neighbourhood Policy instrument). 
4.1 Going external: from Edinburgh to The Hague 
The ED-JHA epitomises cooperative undertakings that aim to govern joint efforts between 
the EU and its partners, in order to alleviate threats that are ostensibly relevant to EU internal 
security. In recent years, the ENP has become the main forum within which the EU pools its 
efforts and resources with partners in order to maintain or increase social order. Yet, the ED-
JHA cannot be reduced to the ENP, however compelling this framework might be. In fact, 
securing EU internal order by working with third countries is a relatively old project, going 
back to the end of the 1980s, and has taken different forms since then. This is not to suggest 
that the EC/EU had formal competence of any kind in this domain. Indeed, the first steps in 
drawing attention to the ED-JHA were to a great extent the preserve of a community 
institution, without much ambition to enlist the aims in a coherent policy.  
A caveat: to try and tease out all the policy initiatives having an external dimension might 
lead to a patchwork approach, an approach which, while giving the impression of 
comprehensiveness, would be dispersed and probably miss more than it claims to integrate. 
I believe such a comprehensive approach is possible, but must be focused on one sector 
(e.g. crime, drug trafficking, etc.), through which the logic of externalisation will thus be 
examined. Finally, I am confident that those who might be interested in doing just that would 
still find useful what is proposed below.  
I discuss five main developments: one, the Edinburgh European Council (Council of the 
European Union 1992); two, the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration – 
HLWG (Council of the European Union 1998); three, the Tampere European Council 
(Council of the European Union 1999); four, the Seville European Council (Council of the 
European Union 2002); five, the Hague Programme (Council of the European Union 2004). I 
am not claiming that these moments have the same status, nor that their insights are of 
equal interest. Instead, I argue that despite their relative importance, they merit significant 
attention, either for what they achieve or for what they make possible in the construction of 
the ED-JHA. 
4.1.1 The Edinburgh European Council: 1992 
Two circumstances paved the way for the Edinburgh European Council, both emphasising 
the mounting necessity to address the root causes of irregular migration. The first is the 1987 
Resolution of the European Parliament on the Right of Asylum, which calls for economic and 
political cooperation with third countries as a means to safeguard human rights and social 
order. The second is the 1991 Commission Communication on immigration. This text 
represents perhaps the first clear articulation of the EU ambition to engage external aspects 
of JHA, though limited to alleviating migration pressures. While only the 1991 
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Communication was taken up by the 1992 Edinburgh European Council, the 1987 European 
Parliament Resolution contributed, I think, to establishing an intellectual climate conducive to 
more focused policies.  
Most of the measures of the Edinburgh European Council are not, however, included in the 
Presidency Conclusions, as it is often the case. Instead, these are gathered in a “Declaration 
on Principles Governing External Aspects of Migration Policy”, which is appended to the 
Conclusions. In its intrinsic properties, the Edinburgh European Council is not only 
institutionally, but substantially important. The European Council met the first time since the 
Maastricht Treaty, which allowed it to intervene in the domain of foreign policy and in the 
context of JHA (Léonard, 2006, p.4). Institutionally, within the new context of a pillar 
structure, the Declaration acknowledges that EU external action in the domain of illegal 
migration depends on strong coordination among different sectors – foreign affairs, economic 
cooperation, and of course, asylum and migration – involving different actors.  
Substantially, the Edinburgh European Council combines two approaches to curb irregular 
migration, the root cause and the control approaches. The first intends to establish 
readmission agreements, i.e., a policy by which two or more states agree to readmit their 
own nationals or a third country national who transited through their country, and who do not 
or no longer fulfil the conditions for entry or stay in the territory of the requesting state. In 
effect, the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) provides, since its 
Amsterdam revision (TEC, Article 63.3.b), for the Community competence in adopting 
measures concerning the repatriation of illegal residents. The second aims to develop 
conditions which might help to address ‘push factors’ in the countries of origin: “the 
preservation of peace and the termination of armed conflicts; full respects for human rights; 
the creation of democratic societies and adequate social conditions; a liberal trade policy” 
(Council of the European Union, 1992, p.46). 
4.1.2 The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (1998) 
The HLWG is the second constitutive moment, probably one of the most dynamics in the 
development of ED-JHA. The HLWG is a task force set up on 7 December 1998 by the 
Council of the European Union, on a Dutch proposal. It is composed of officials from the 
Commission and representatives from member states. Ultimately, the role of the HLWG is to 
map transit points and countries of origin of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, in order 
to “establish a common, integrated, cross-pillar approach” (Bulletin EU 12-1998, JHA 
cooperation 5/18). The HLWG did not have a proper geographic focus as it aims to target 
any country from which, or through which, asylum seekers and migrants proceed to reach 
the territory of the EU. Thus, Action Plans were drawn up as regards a composite group of 
countries, including Afghanistan, Albania, Morocco, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. These 
were then discussed at the Tampere European Council (Council of the European Union 
1999).  
The HLWG is associated with three contextual factors that brought enormous changes to the 
ways of addressing external challenges to EU internal security. The first is the 1994 
Commission Communication on the need to establish a comprehensive approach to 
migration. The second is the mandate granted to the EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
to work at the international (i.e. systemic) level in the field of JHA. The third is consistent with 
the comprehensive approach, but sets up a ‘concentric circle’ model of migration policy. The 
Strategy Paper on Migration and Asylum Policy (Council of the European Union1998, p.19), 
discussed at the Vienna European Council in December 1998 put it in the following terms:  
the Schengen States currently lay down the most intensive control measures. Their 
neighbours (essentially the associated States and perhaps also the Mediterranean 
area) should gradually be linked into a similar system which should be brought 
increasingly into line with the first circle’s standard (Schengen) particularly with 
regard to visa, border control and readmission policies. A third circle of States (CIS 
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area, Turkey and North Africa) will then concentrate primarily on transit checks and 
combating facilitator networks, and a fourth circle (Middle East, China, black Africa) 
on eliminating push factors.  
 
 
 
Fabrizio Tassinari (2005, p. 3) maps it thus: 
Table 2. Distribution of Europe’s concentric circles 
 Countries in the Wider Europe 
Circle No. 1. EU core Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain 
Circle No. 2. ‘Opt-out’ EU member 
states  
Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, UK 
Circle No. 3. New EU member states  Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Circle No. 4. EEA countries  Iceland, Norway, Switzerland 
Circle No. 5. Negotiating, non-
negotiating and prospective EU 
candidate countries  
Bulgaria and Romania;  
Croatia and Turkey; 
Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia-Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania 
Circle No. 6. European neighbours  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Russia, Ukraine  
Circle No. 7. Non-European neighbours  Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, 
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia.  
 
Thus, the key policy orientations of the HLWG are a direct product of these contextual 
factors. Léonard (2006, p.10) argues that the concentric circle approach promotes, in fact, 
two different strategies towards EU’s partners, as if they were incompatible, or were more 
effective in one region and not in the other, which is difficult to uphold given the strong 
commonalities of issues that the EU has to face up to. On the one hand, a root cause model 
is geared towards Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, while a control approach is crafted 
for neighbourhood countries. Thus, although not all ideas set out previously are amplified 
therein, projects to conclude readmission agreements with third countries and to link EU 
international relations to migration issues suggest that the HLWG is not opening up new 
avenues, but reinforces old policy orientations.  
However, the HLWG brings a radical policy shift, by proposing that substantial parts of the 
budget allocated to development aid be used to tackle migration and asylum issues. This 
constitutes one of the major vulnerabilities of proposals made by the HLWG. In fact, officials 
from the Directorate General for external relations found it ticklish to divert diplomatic means 
aimed at fostering good relationships with third countries, to different projects, whatever their 
centrality might be (e.g. the fight against illegal migration or human trafficking). Another 
vulnerability of the HLWG Action Plans is that they were not negotiated with the third 
countries concerned, which led to resistances. Thus, while the HLWG managed to set an 
integrated approach to migration, human trafficking and asylum, as a master strategy, it 
failed to muster enough support both internally and externally, leading to wobbly results.  
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4.1.3 The Tampere European Council (1999) 
It is often argued that the Tampere European Council offers the first clear articulation of the 
connection between EU foreign and interior policies. We have shown that this is not entirely 
true. What is neglected, moreover, is the fact that the linkage between the two policies is 
established through the use of specific tools. The Presidency Conclusions put it thus: “The 
European Council underlines that all competences and instruments at the disposal of the 
Union, and in particular, in external relations must be used in an integrated and consistent 
way to build the area of freedom, security and justice” (Council of the European Union, 1999, 
point 59). But the relation between foreign and interior policies is not, as this quote might 
suggest, unidirectional, i.e. outside-in. It is also inside-out: “Justice and Home Affairs 
concerns must be integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies and 
activities” (Ibid.) 
To a certain extent, Tampere renews and consolidates the mandate conceded to the HLWG, 
in crafting Action Plans in order to build a more comprehensive system and increase the 
efficiency of EU policy, in the management of migration flows. Moreover, the conclusions of 
the European Council meeting insist on readmission agreements, or at least the inclusion of 
“readmission clauses in other agreements between the European Community and relevant 
third countries or group of countries.” Finally, the Tampere European Council sets out the 
road to follow: 
clear priorities, policy objectives and measures for the Union’s external action in 
Justice and Home Affairs should be defined. Specific recommendations should be 
drawn up by the Council in close co-operation with the Commission on policy 
objectives and measures for the Union’s external action in Justice and Home 
Affairs…prior to the European Council in June 2000. 
Thus, in order to put the recommendation into concrete terms, the European Council of 
Santa Maria de Feira (Council of the European Union 2000b, pp. 7-8) structures the priorities 
in the ED-JHA around five axes:  
• Migration policy: foster partnership with countries of origin, develop a cross-pillar 
approach to the issue…strengthen the external borders and conclude Community 
readmission agreements; 
• The fight against organised crime and terrorism: give a key role to Europol and better 
involve third countries in the action; 
• The fight against specific forms of crime (e.g. financial crime, money laundering, 
corruption, trafficking in human beings, high-tech crime, and environmental crime); 
• The fight against drug trafficking; 
• The development and consolidation of the rule of law in countries on the path to 
democracy. 
Thus, the approach laid out by the Feira European Council considerably widens the scope of 
the ED-JHA. In fact, although migration seems to remain on top of the list, other policy items 
are firmly set on the agenda (e.g. terrorism, drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering). 
The ability of the ED-JHA to generate a certain outcome, therefore, presupposes clear and 
frequent interactions among the different fields, in effect calling for a coordination mechanism 
between EU institutions. The challenge of students of EU politics is to, first, disaggregate 
these different sectors in order to explicate their inherent features and, second, to 
amalgamate them back in order to attend to the practices they generate or not. 
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4.1.4 The Seville European Council (2002) 
While the debates at Feira and Tampere were more consensual, which does not by any 
means suggest that they did not raise serious practical problems, the Seville European 
Council was permeated with controversies sparked by an initiative of the Spanish Presidency 
and supported by the UK (Peers, 2004). The ambition was clear: to substantially reorganise 
the external domain of EU asylum and migration policies. Two issues drew attention, both of 
which had the ambition to alleviate the push factors underlying migration. First, the 
requirement made by the Spanish Presidency that third countries entering into relationship 
with the EU fulfil a predefined list of criteria (e.g., ratify the UN Convention on organised 
crime and relevant Protocols, run awareness campaigns, step up border controls and police 
operations against smugglers and traffickers and readmit, whenever possible, its own 
nationals and third country nationals having transited through its territory). Second, the 
possibility for the EU, to impose sanctions upon states that refuse to comply or are found to 
make insufficient efforts to live up to EU expectations. However, after long discussions, the 
Presidency conclusions became less demanding than the Spanish and British governments 
had wished for. They state:  
After full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms without success, 
the Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack 
of cooperation in joint management of migration flows. In that event the Council may, 
in accordance with the rules laid down in the Treaties, adopt measures or positions 
under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other European Union policies, 
while honouring the Union’s contractual commitments and not jeopardising 
development cooperation objectives (European Council, 2002, p.11).   
One of the immediate outputs of the Seville European Council was the 2002(703) 
Commission Communication on the integration of migration issues in the EU relations with 
third countries. Emphasis was put on the root causes of migration and the impact of 
migration processes on the EU and the countries of origin. Thus, through a surprising policy 
curve, we are somewhat brought back to the view expressed by the European Parliament 
Resolution in 1987. This surfaces in the treatment of migration, not exclusively through the 
control lens, as was a tendency in the 1990s, but also via the root cause approach which has 
the benefit of connecting migration to a wide spectrum of distinct and previously unrelated 
factors (e.g. development, conflict, state collapse and infectious disease). This view was 
amplified by the Hague Programme in November 2004, to which I now turn. 
4.1.5 The Hague Programme (2004) 
The Hague programme draws a five-year policy agenda in order to develop an EU area of 
freedom, security, and justice. The programme aims to address three kinds of threat; the 
fight against terrorism, cross-border crime (e.g. human trafficking, drug smuggling) and 
irregular migration (Balzacq and Carrera, 2006, p.19). However, only irregular migration has 
received much attention within the framework of the ED-JHA. Other policies are left to the 
latter (Council of the European Union, 2004, p.30). The Hague programme organises JHA 
external activities around two pillars. On the one hand, partnerships with countries and 
regions of origin or transit help to carve out instruments that could uproot the causes and 
factors of irregular migration (e.g., capacity-building, joint resettlement programmes, poverty 
alleviation). On the other hand, return and readmission policies are regarded as necessary 
for the establishment of a credible EU area of FSJ. These policies involve not only 
cooperation between member states in the domain of expulsion of third country nationals and 
the development of common standards to implement such expulsions, but also the 
increasing institutionalisation of all the components of the ED-JHA.     
The Commission strategy (Commission of the European Communities 2005) on the external 
dimension of freedom, security and justice, fits the Hague programme mold. It sets out 
issues, principles, and instruments necessary for the design of an effective ED-FSJ. It is 
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important to note that topics identified are actually a distillation of a number of priorities 
outlined by other documents (e.g. the strategic concept on organised crime and the EU 
Action Plan against terrorism). Thus, the problems that confront the ED-JHA include the 
promotion of human rights, strengthening institutions and good governance, border 
management as it relates to the control of asylum and migration, the fight against terrorism 
and organised crime. Many studies naturally focus on how these threats emerge (i.e. 
securitisation) and attempt to understand the consequences such constructions have on 
policies. By contrast, students tend not to attach much significance to the principles and 
instruments of the ED-FSJ. In my view, this is just where more work needs to be done, 
because principles and instruments are powerful indicators of both the content and rationales 
of a policy.  
The construction, implementation and evaluation of the ED-JHA follow a catalogue of 
principles which are meant to ensure that the policy bears fruit, with little if any indirect effect. 
Thus principles aim, primarily, to structure the development of the ED-JHA. But, contrary to 
what is often claimed, there is no explicit reference to conditionality here; instead, the 
Commission Communication emphasises socialisation, as it holds that lasting results could 
only be achieved if, at the end, partners ‘own’ EU norms and values. In addition to 
ownership, the other principles comprise geographic focus, differentiation, flexibility, cross-
pillar coordination, relevance of external action, added value and benchmarking. At a crude 
level, principles condition the kind of instruments that are mobilised, or at least how selected 
instruments function. However, the Communication conflates instruments, policies and 
programmes. For instance, development policy is called an instrument, as well as regional 
cooperation. Be that as it may, the Communication proposes the following gamut of 
‘instruments’: bilateral agreements, enlargement and pre-accession processes; ENP Action 
Plans, regional cooperation, individual arrangements, operational cooperation, institutional 
building and twinning, development policy, external aid programmes, international 
organisations and monitoring.  
In sum, the EU strategy on the ED-FSJ, despite its conceptual weakness, offers a tractable 
approach as to how the ED-FSJ should develop, in order to strengthen EU internal security 
and promote its objectives abroad. Moreover, it institutionalises the view that internal and 
external securities are intertwined. Finally, it proposes distinctive instruments that are meant 
to inform the ED-JHA. In many ways, the spirit of the Commission Communication is like that 
of the ENP. In fact, the ENP offers a coherent framework for integrating the different wings of 
the ED-JHA. By the same token, the ENP is an attempt to substitute a comprehensive and 
coordinated scheme for a fragmented approach to the ED-JHA.  
4.2 ENP Action Plans: the JHA dimension 
The relationships between the EU and its neighbours are structured by Action Plans. I define 
an Action Plan as a commonly agreed framework (i.e., a programme) containing the list of 
policies upon which the EU and ENP partners decide to cooperate. More decisively, 
however, Action Plans condition not only what to do, but how to do it. In other words, they 
are both descriptive and prescriptive documents. The development of Action Plans follows 
the principle of differentiation, meaning that each agreement is carved out in order to meet 
the demands and expectations of each partner. This explains, if only in part, why countries 
belonging to the same region, neither enjoy the same kind of relationship with the EU nor, as 
a consequence, necessarily have the same substantive type of Action Plan. Generally, 
however, the fields around which cooperation on JHA matters is organised are similar across 
Action Plans, though they naturally vary in the level of detail aspired to. For instance, EU-
Ukraine relations in the domain of JHA is embodied by a specific Action Plan, signed on 12th 
December 2001, subsequently revised in 2005. It covers all the main items of EU-JHA and 
brings with it a scoreboard, which monitors the progress achieved. It could therefore be said 
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that Ukraine has, as it stands, one of – if not the most – advanced programmes of 
cooperation with the EU in the field of JFS. 
In defining cooperation in the field of JHA, the ENP Action Plans usually differentiate six 
areas of action: 1. migration (legal and illegal, re-admission, visas, asylum); 2. border 
management; 3. cooperation in combating organised crime; 4. the fight against drug 
trafficking; 5. the fight against money laundering, economic and financial crimes; and 6. 
judicial and police cooperation. A closer look at Action Plans provisions on JHA suggests that 
cooperation is premised upon an effective mechanism of border management and control. In 
recent years, it has become evident that one of the lines of contention between the EU and 
its neighbours was mobility and the thorny issue of visa. Clearly, then, the challenge of the 
ENP is, primarily, to alleviate the concerns of its neighbours that the new policy will not affect 
their relationships with former allies nor lead to a stringent approach as regards free 
movement of persons. The other challenge, equally important for the EU, is to ensure that 
the flexibility introduced in border management, for instance, is fair and balanced enough to 
contain and deter illegal migration. Few, of course, will disagree that this is a tricky position to 
uphold. The 2006 Commission Communication on Strengthening the ENP highlights, indeed, 
that: “Mobility of persons is of the utmost importance also for all ENP partners.” It continues 
by warning that: 
the Union cannot fully deliver on many aspects of the ENP if the ability to undertake 
legitimate short term travel is as constrained as it is currently. Yet our existing visa 
policies and practices often impose real difficulties and obstacles to legitimate travel 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006, p. 5). 
Finally, it goes on to propose: 
this can only be addressed in the context of broader packages to address related 
issues such as cooperation on illegal immigration, in particular by sea, combating 
trafficking and smuggling in human beings, efficient border management, 
readmissions agreements and effective return of illegal migrants…. (Ibid.).  
These policies are not without problem, however. For instance, to “stem the flow of illegal 
migrants”, readmission agreements have become the main tool of EC policy (Document UE-
MA 2702/1 REV 1, 27th July 2005). Yet, based on strong and reliable empirical works, 
different reports and academic research highlight that readmission agreements consistently 
raise important issues as regards the respect of human rights and dignity (see Roig and 
Huddleston, 2007). Specifically, this happens in two ways, at least. On the one hand, many 
of the countries with which the EC has established readmission agreements, have notorious 
negative human rights records (e.g. Russia). Second, some states that have readmission 
agreements with the EC have set up additional agreements of the same kind, probably not of 
similar content or safeguards, with other third countries (Balzacq, 2008b). For example, 
Ukraine has signed readmission agreements with various states, some of which have 
specific covenants with the EC, as diverse as Turkmenistan, Georgia, Turkey, Moldova or 
Vietnam. This makes the issue of readmission agreements particularly complex, by diluting 
the responsibility of the partners with regard to the safety of those transferred.  
 
In lieu of Conclusion: Policy Recommendations 
The credibility of the ED-JHA will probably depend on the extent to which it complies with, 
and enforces, the values it claims to export abroad. In this respect,  
1. The objectives of the ENP as they relate to identity issue should be 
clearly articulated, for non member states to know how to adjust to 
this new requirement, if any; 
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2. The EU should be warry that the ENP is not perceived as a new 
“imperial” project;  
3. The three pillars of the ENP, stability, security, and prosperity should 
be equally valued; as it is, security has triumphed over the two 
others pillars; 
4. It would be useful if the EU clarified its geographical limits; this 
would enable states that aspire to enter the EU to know whether 
they have any chance to do so; the current state amplifies the 
ambiguity of the ENP; 
5. The tools used in the management of borders should fully comply 
with international human rights standards, including non-refoulement 
principles. 
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